ABSTRACT With the continuous development of the Internet of Things (IoT), various IoT devices create an incomprehensible amount of data all the time. However, the IoT devices have limited computing and storage resources and are difficult to process massive data locally, so they often introduce servers to help them for calculating or analyzing data. At present, the ''IoT + Cloud'' mode has been widely accepted. How to protect users' privacy in the public cloud environment has become critical. Among the common methods of processing data in the server, pattern matching is an important one which aims to identify the appearance and location of a string (called pattern) within a larger string or text. There are a lot of studies on privacy-preserving pattern matching protocols, but most protocols are constructed using heavy public-key cryptographic operations, which are not applicable to IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a new protocol using secret sharing and oblivious transfer (OT) and latter improve its efficiency with OT extension, so it is very efficient for lightweight IoT devices. In addition, our protocol also supports query with wildcards which can be used for the batch search. This protocol is provable-secure against honest-but-curious adversaries. Both the theoretical and experimental results show that our protocol can be used in real-world IoT applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an important part of the new generation of information technology. Its core and foundation is still the Internet but is an extended network and the clients in IoT extend to any things. IoT is widely used in real-world applications through communication-aware technologies such as intelligent sensing, identification technology and pervasive computing. It is also considered to be the third wave of the development of world information industry after Computer and Internet. Recently, according to Cisco and Ericsson's predictions, more than 20 billion IoT devices will be connected to the Internet by 2021 [1] . Therefore, IoT industry is considered to be one of the most promising industries in the future.
In many application scenarios, the IoT technology connects a large number of sensors to network to collect real-time
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Weizhi Meng. data, and it combines sensing capabilities with computational and data analysis capabilities of back-end applications to extract valuable information. In recent years, with the development of IoT devices becoming more and more perfect, the data collected by device also shows diversification of uses, such as smart cities, smart medical and industrial internet of things etc. In smart city scene, the sensor collects data about traffic, energy, air quality and other real-time data and uploads it to the back-end server [2] - [4] . After server processes the data, it immediately gives feedback and the IoT devices make response. In smart medical scene, the wearable device collects patient's body data in real time and uploads it to the medical server which processes data and provides feedback [5] - [8] . Then the wearable device displays different content based on feedback and doctor can infer patient's health condition. In industrial IoT scene, there are a huge amount of real-time data in the process of production. Due to the limited computing power of device, it is necessary to introduce a cloud platform to analyze the data and return the extracted useful information to devices [9] , [10] . The information is propitious to make decision about production for company.
In these applications, when it needs to determine whether the data collected by IoT devices satisfies certain features, pattern matching as a basic technology in computer science is often needed. It's essentially a search problem that finds the position of a given pattern p ∈ [ ] m in the text t ∈ [ ] n , where is an alphabet set. However, in the distributed computing scenario, the leakage of private information is becoming more and more serious. People do not want to disclose their own information when performing pattern matching. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the private data is not leaked. The research on secure pattern matching protocol can be traced back to [11] in 2007. They focus on exact pattern matching and turn them into evaluation problems of oblivious automata. Later, there are few references [12] - [16] to improve its efficiency and security. In addition, some scholars use different techniques such as oblivious pseudo-random computing [17] , [18] and Yao garbled circuits [19] to give different protocol structures.
In recent years, the development of pattern matching has been mainly manifested in the functional extension, including approximate pattern matching, wildcard pattern matching and so on. Research on privacy-preserving wildcards pattern matching is a hot topic in recent years. Hazay and Toft [20] , [21] convert wildcard pattern matching to exact pattern matching using additive homomorphic encryption scheme. Baron et al. [22] studied the generalization of non-binary alphabets. Their main idea is based on linear algebraic formulas and additive homomorphic encryption scheme. In addition, a wildcard pattern matching protocol based on symmetric somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme are constructed in [23] and [24] . They constructed data packaging method that efficiently calculates multiple Hamming distances of encrypted data. Their protocol can be applied to non-binary data and can query 16,500-length gene sequence per second. In 2017, Kolesnikov et al. [25] constructed an efficient secure wildcard pattern matching protocol based on OT extension. They use OT protocol so that two participants can calculate a random value together and then invoke secure string equality test (SSET) to determine whether the pattern matching is successful. Recently, Darivandpour and Atallah [26] give a more efficient protocol construction. Their scheme fits all character sets and supports input of any size.
As we all know, the data generated by IoT devices often acts as a pattern and to match specific text holding by server. Then the interaction result is returned to device and device responds differently according to it. Taking smart medical as an example. The sensor collects physiological parameters of the patient and transmits them to corresponding sever by wireless communication, then the sever matches the received data with the text to obtain patient's health status or disease information. This process is shown in Fig.1 . In order to protect the privacy of both parties, device shouldn't send the information collected by sensor directly and the server shouldn't obtain final result of the matching problem. So a privacy-preserving pattern matching protocol is needed. The protocol should output location where pattern appears in text while satisfying the following security attributes: (1) pattern p is kept secret to server; (2) the pattern provider doesn't know anything else in the text other than where p appears. There are a few references about privacy-preserving pattern matching protocols as we discussed above, but most of them mainly use public-key cryptographic operation which are difficult to run on IoT devices. Therefore, we propose a lightweight privacy-preserving wildcards pattern matching protocol in this paper, so that the device providing pattern and the server owning text can complete matching problem without leaking their own data.
In this paper, we propose an efficient wildcards pattern matching protocol. Specifically, we first compose a protocol using secret sharing and oblivious transfer and latterly improve its efficiency with OT extension. The offline phase of our protocol only requires XOR operations on bit strings without defining other data structures, so it is very efficient and suitable for lightweight IoT devices. We prove its security against semi-honest adversaries. Both theoretical and experiment show that our scheme is capable of real-world applications.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. In section II, we introduce some preliminaries and definitions. Then, we propose the construction of our two-party wildcard pattern matching protocol and give its correctness analysis in section III. In section IV, we give the security proof in the semi-honest model. In section V, experiments and application of IoT are shown. At the end, we present the conclusion of our work in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
A. SECRET SHARING Secret sharing scheme was first proposed by Shamir [27] and Blakley [28] in 1979. Its function is to distribute a secret to multiple participants, each of whom gets a share of the secret. The secret can be reconstructed only if the number of shares exceeds the threshold. In this paper, we use a trivial secret sharing scheme, called XOR-secret-sharing scheme. It is an (n, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme. That is to say, the secret is divided into n shares, and all shares are needed VOLUME 7, 2019 to reconstruct the secret. There are two algorithms in this scheme:
• Secret splitting algorithm:
It takes secret s ∈ {0, 1} λ and number of shares m as input, and sets m secret shares in the following way, where λ is the security parameter: 
B. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
The oblivious transfer (OT) protocol was first proposed by Rabin [29] in 1981. As a basic protocol in cryptography, it has been widely used in secure multiparty computation. OT protocol involves two parties, one is a sender S and the other is a receiver R. Sender S transfers a set of messages to receiver R, and receiver R can obtain a subset of the messages, but sender S does not know what messages he received. In 1-out-of-2 OT (OT 1 2 ), which we used in this paper, a sender S with inputs x 0 and x 1 interacts with a receiver R who has a input choice bit b ∈ {0, 1}. After that, the receiver R gets the output x b without learning anything about x 1−b . The sender S has no output and learns nothing about b. In the following, we give a detailed description about the functionality of OT 1 2 in Fig.2 :
To our knowledge, secure string equality test protocol was first proposed by Fagin et al. [30] in 1996. There are two party in this protocol, the sender S holds a string x 0 , and the receiver R holds a string x 1 . At the end of the protocol, R learns whether x 0 = x 1 and nothing else, while S learns nothing. The functionality of it is proposed in Fig.3 .
D. COMPUTATIONAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY
Let X = {X (a, n)} a∈{0,1} * ;n∈N and Y = {Y (a, n)} a∈{0,1} * ;n∈N be two distribution ensembles indexed by a security parameter n; we say X and Y are computationally indistinguishable, i.e. X c ≡ Y , if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A with input a ∈ {0, 1} * and n ∈ N, the following quantity is a negligible function in n:
E. SECURITY DEFINITION
We mainly consider the semi-honest adversary, that is, two participants strictly follow the protocol, but expect to obtain input information of the other from their own view. Our formal definitions here are according to [31] . We present a formalization based on the simulation paradigm.
• Let f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a probabilistic polynomial-time functionality and π be a two-party protocol for computing f . f 1 (x, y) and f 2 (x, y) represent the first and second elements of f (x, y), respectively.
• In an execution of π on (x,y) and security parameter n, the view of the i-th party (i ∈ {1, 2}) is denoted by
, where w ∈ (x, y), r i indicates the content of the i-th party's internal random tape, and m i j represents the j-th message that is received.
• In an execution of π on (x,y) and security parameter n, the output of the i-th party is denoted by output π i (x, y, n) and is implicit in the party's view of the execution. Definition 1: We say π securely computes a functionality f in the presence of static semi-honest adversaries if there exist PPT algorithms S 1 and S 2 , such that
This definition states that the view of a party can be simulated by a PPT algorithm given access to the party's input and output only.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING TWO-PARTY WILDCARD PATTERN MATCHING PROTOCOL
The functionality of two-party wildcard pattern matching F WPM mainly involves two participants, P 1 and P 2 , in which P 1 holds a text string t and P 2 holds a pattern string p. P 2 wants to get the locations if p appears in t. Again, P 1 and P 2 do not want to reveal their own data (except input length) to each other when performing pattern matching. The functionality is provided as follows in Fig.4 .
In order to achieve the functionality F WPM , we propose a privacy-preserving two-party wildcard pattern matching protocol π WPM . First of all, we introduce the protocol at a high level. In order to search a specific m-bit substring in an n-bit main string (n ≥ m), it needs to slide the substring in the main string bit by bit. An n-bit main string has n−m+1 m-bit substrings, therefore, the protocol needs to process n − m + 1 times. For the k-th time, P 1 holds an m-bit substring t k , which is the k-th substring of t from the left, and P 2 holds m-bit pattern string p. If and only if t k is equal to p bit by bit, the matching is successful at location k. In order to test whether t k is equal to p while protecting the data privacy of both parties, we use secret sharing and oblivious transfer techniques. First of all, P 2 divides a random secret s into m parts according to the length of p, i.e. each bit of p corresponds to a secret share s i . At the same time, a random share r i is selected for each bit of p. Then, P 1 and P 2 execute m times 1-out-of-2 OT protocol, which P 1 acts as the receiver and P 2 acts as the sender. In the j-th OT execution, the input of P 1 is the j-th bit of t k and the input of P 2 is a pair (s 0
That is to say, the input of P 2 is either a pair of true share and random share or a pair of same true shares. If the j-th bit of t k is equal to the j-th bit of p, or the j-th bit of p is wildcard * , P 1 will get the true share. After executing m times OT 1 2 , if t k is match to p bit by bit, then P 1 can get all the correct secret shares and recover the secret s. We can judge whether t k and p are equal by judging whether the secret recovered by P 1 is equal to the secret randomly selected by P 2 . In this process, the data privacy of both parties is guaranteed. We note, when a bit in p is a wildcard bit, no matter what the corresponding bit in t k is, P 1 can always get the corresponding true share.
In the following, we give the full description.
Privacy-preserving two-party wildcard pattern matching protocol π WPM
• Inputs: -P 1 holds a text t ∈ {0, 1} n and an integer m; -P 2 holds a pattern p ∈ {0, 1, * } m and an integer n. Let N = n − m + 1 represent the number of m-bit substrings in n-bit main string. (n ≥ m)
• Input representation phase:
-P 2 chooses a secret s k ∈ {0, 1} λ randomly, where λ is security parameter. It runs secret splitting algorithm of XOR-secretsharing scheme to get m secret shares, i.e.
These values are used as inputs of P 2 in the oblivious transfer protocol of next phase.
• Oblivious transfer and secret reconstruction phase: For k ∈ [1, N ], P 1 and P 2 jointly perform 1-outof-2 OT protocols m times, where P 1 acts as the receiver and P 2 acts as the sender. In the j-th OT execution: -P 1 takes the j-th bit t k,j of substring t k as input. Correctness: Before proving the security of this protocol, we firstly analyze the correctness, that is, P 2 will eventually get the correct result. We explain the correctness from the following two aspects: VOLUME 7, 2019 • If the match is successful, it means that at least one m-bit substring in t matches the pattern p. All values on the non-wildcard bits in pattern p are equal to the values of substring in corresponding positions. Therefore, in OT protocol, all legal secret shares are received by P 1 when this substring is used as input. As for wildcard bits, P 1 always get legal share in corresponding position. Finally, with these legal secret shares, P 1 can reconstruct the same secret s k as P 2 randomly selected s k before, and the output of string equality test with inputs s k and s k must be 1. Thus, P 2 learns that this substring can match successfully with pattern p and knows the starting location of matching substring.
• If there is no successful match, it means that no m-bit substring in t match the pattern p. It indicates that at least one bit on non-wildcard bits in pattern p differs from the value of substring in corresponding position. Therefore, in OT protocol, the value P 1 gets is an unlegal share at this position. According to the functionality of XORsecret-sharing scheme, the number of legal shares is less than m, which makes it impossible to correctly construct secret s k . Therefore, the result of the string equality test must be 0, i.e., the match is unsuccessful.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We prove the security of π WPM in semi-honest adversary model. The protocol mainly involves three cryptographic primitives, namely secret sharing, oblivious transfer and string equality test. Intuitively, since oblivious transfer protocol is secure, the input information of P 1 is kept secret to P 2 which ensures that t is not leaked. According to the nature of secret sharing scheme, it does not reveal the information of shares when the number of shares is insufficient to reconstruct secret. In addition, in string equality test, the participant P 2 with input string p can only receive output 1 or output 0 and knows nothing about P 1 . The participant P 1 with input string t does not know anything about p either. In this way, the security of this protocol can be guaranteed through the nature of three basic primitives above.
In the following, we present formal security proof of protocol π WPM based on security definition in previous section. 
where R OT 1 (t, s σ ) denotes the incoming messages of P 1 from the appropriate real oblivious transfer execution, R SSET 1 (s ) denotes the incoming messages from real string equality test execution.
Observing that the only difference between two distributions above is that the simulator S 1 randomly selects a pattern p instead of using the real input of P 2 , so secret sharing share in the input of S OT 1 are different from it in the input of R OT 1 . However, according to oblivious transfer protocol, the view of P 1 in OT can be generated without knowing the input of P 2 , which means that the simulation can be completed without using the secret sharing shares. Assuming that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can distinguish the two distributions, it means that it can learn the bits of P 2 which is contrary to the security of oblivious transfer protocol.
Specifically, we first prove the security of the simulated views for OT. As we can see, OT are needed to execute m(n − m + 1) times and S OT 1, i 
.
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It follows that there exists an i such that for t, m,
. Now, using D to contradict the security of the OT protocol. We note that the only difference between H i (t, m) and H i+1 (t, m) is that message transcript of the i + 1-th OT are according to R OT 1 (t, s σ i+1 ) in H i and according to S 1 (t, s σ i+1 ) in H i+1 . However, we can easily see that for infinitely many inputs, it is possible to distinguish P 1 's view in real OT execution from its simulated view with the same probability that it is possible to distinguish H i (t, m) from H i+1 (t, m) . It contradicts the security of the OT protocol. We therefore conclude that
Similarly, according to the characteristics of secure string equality test, the view of P 1 can be generated without knowing the input of P 2 . Even if the secret reconstructed by P 1 is corresponding to the random pattern p, the two distributions are also computationally indistinguishable. P 2 Is Corrupted: In this case, we construct a simulator S 2 that is given inputs of a pattern p ∈ {0, 1, * } m , an integer n and output of result which is the output of ideal function F SSET and result ∈ {0, 1}. Then S 2 generates the view of P 2 .
Let S OT 2 be the simulator that is used for party P 2 in OT protocol. Simulator S 2 invokes the simulator S OT 2 upon input p in which p is the pattern. Simulator S 2 performs different operations according to result. Specifically, result = 1 indicates that the substring of text t is successfully matched with the pattern p. At this time, S 2 needs to construct a text t in accordance with p, the text t needs to satisfy that the non-wildcard bits are matched with the pattern and the wildcard bits are randomly selected. result = 0 indicates that the substring of text t fails to match the pattern p, then simulator S 2 needs to randomly selects a text t as the input of F OT 1 2 . Let S SSET 2 be the simulator that is used for party P 2 in secure string equality test. Simulator S 2 invokes the simulator S SSET 2 upon input and output (s, result) in which s is the secret randomly selected by P 2 and result is the output of F SSET . Similarly, result = 1 indicates that the substring of text t is successfully matched with the pattern p and S 2 needs to select the same secret s as P 2 . result = 0 indicates that the substring of text t fails to match the pattern p, then simulator S 2 needs to randomly selects a secret. We therefore have that S 2 outputs (p, n, result, S OT 2 (p), S SSET 2 (s, result)). We should prove that the output of simulator S 2 is computationally indistinguishable from the view of P 2 , that is
where R OT 2 (p) denotes the incoming messages of P 2 from the appropriate real oblivious transfer execution, R SSET 2 (s, result) denotes the incoming messages from real string equality test execution.
Observing that S 2 always selects inputs of oblivious transfer protocol and string equality test based on result, that is, the result between S 2 and View 2 is always the same. Taking result = 1 as an example, it means that only wildcard bits of p are different from t which are constructed by S 2 . However, the wildcard bits are irrelevant to the matching result when OT protocol is executed and the s selected by S 2 when result = 1 is the same as the secret of P 2 . Similarly, simulator S 2 randomly selects a text and a secret when result = 0 which means the matching is unsuccessful. According to the security of oblivious transfer protocol and string equality test, the view of P 2 can be generated without knowing the input of P 1 . So the distributions above are also computationally indistinguishable.
Specifically, we also prove a hybrid argument over the simulated views for the OTs. We define a hybrid distribution H i , i ∈ {1, . . . , m(n − m + 1)} in which the first i OTs are simulated and the last m(n − m + 1) − i are real. Formally, let result) ) and H 0 (p, n, result) is exactly the same as
We now prove that
By contradiction, assume that there exists a PPT distinguisher D and a polynomial p (·) such that,
It follows that there exists an i such that for p, n, result,
We now use D to contradict the security of the oblivious transfer protocol. First, note that the only difference between H i (p, n, result) and H i+1 (p, n, result) is that message transcript of the i + 1-th OT are according to R OT 2 (p) in H i and according to S 2 (p) in H i+1 . However, we can easily see that for infinitely many inputs, it is possible to distinguish the view of P 2 in a real OT execution from its simulated view with the same probability that it is possible to distinguish H i (p, n, result) from H i+1 (p, n, result). It contradicts the security of the OT protocol. We therefore conclude that Similarly, according to the characteristics of secure string equality test, the view of P 2 can be generated without knowing the input of P 1 . So the distributions above are also computationally indistinguishable. Now we complete the formal proof of theorem 1.
V. EFFICIENCY AND EXPERIMENT

A. EFFICIENCY AND COMPARISON
In our protocol, it requires a total of O(nm) OT operations (the secure string equality test can be implemented with OT [32] ). However, if we use OT extension technique, the number of OTs can be greatly reduced to O(k) level where k is security parameter, essentially independent of the number of OTs and can be as small as 80 or 128 [33] . In addition, the communication complexity of this protocol is also O(nm).
In Table 1 , we show the comparison between our protocol and previous wildcard pattern matching protocol. Firstly, we consider cryptographic tools. Reference [14] is based on distributed ElGamal encryption scheme and it needs to implement a joint decryption protocol, [17] is based on homomorphic encryption scheme, [20] is based on OT extension protocol and needs to invoke secure string equality test. In terms of computational complexity, [14] and [17] requires O(nm) operations, where n and m are input length of two participants. The computational complexity of [20] and our protocol is O(k), where k = 128 is security parameter and is smaller than nm, which benefits from OT extension technology. In addition, the communication complexity of [17] is O(nτ ) where τ is statistical security parameter and in the range of about 1024-2048. The communication complexity of [14] and [20] and our protocol are O(nm). Through comparison, we can see that our protocol has the same efficiency as that in [20] . However, in our protocol, the offline phase only requires XOR operations on bit strings without defining other data structures, so it is very easy to implement by hardware and more suitable for low-cost IoT devices.
B. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we implemented our protocol in personal computer. The computer is equipped with an Intel Core i7-6700 processor and 16GBs of RAM. The programming language is C++ based on 64-bit architecture. In offline phase, P 2 runs secret splitting algorithm of XORsecret-sharing scheme, spliting a λ-bit binary string into m shares. P 1 runs secret reconstruction algorithm, combining m shares into a secret. In the whole offline phase, only XOR operations of bit strings are executed, so it is very efficient. Experiment results in this phase are shown in Fig.5 . In online phase, it mainly includes oblivious transfer and secure string equality test. Because secure string equality test can be implemented by oblivious transfer, we only test the efficiency of oblivious transfer. In this phase, we used OT extension technology instead of a large number of parallel execution OT protocols [34] . The results are shown in Fig.6 . As shown in the two figures, the x-coordinate represents the size of P 2 's input m (i.e. the number of bits of m), and the y-coordinate represents the corresponding execution time.
VI. APPLICATION IN SMART MEDICAL
In recent years, the imperfect medical management system, high medical costs and polarized medical resources have brought many social problems. These problems have become an important factor affecting the harmonious development of society. We urgently need to establish a smart medical platform, so that patients can use shorter waiting time and pay for basic medical expenses to enjoy safe, convenient and high-quality medical services. As a development direction of smart medical, wearable devices can conduct health management and disease information prediction. Specifically, the wearable device collects a large amount of health data and interacts with healthcare cloud service to analyze these data. Pattern matching is a common method for processing data. Through pattern matching, we can judge whether the data collected by wearable device conforms to certain characteristics. If there exists successful matching, sever can return health reports or warnings. This process is as follows and shown in Fig.7 .
1. The patient wears wearable device, which collects patient's health data all the time. For the execution of π WPM , device encodes the data into binary string (called pattern) and the string is exactly device's input to this protocol. 2. The medical cloud service holds mass data about health characteristics, and encodes these data into binary text. The text acts as the input of π WPM of cloud service. 3. Wearable device interacts with medical cloud service by wireless transmission. Then, device and cloud service implement our π WPM protocol jointly and return the matching result to wearable device. 4. According to the result, patient can obtain their health condition.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper mainly considers the construction of secure wildcard pattern matching protocol in semi-honest adversary model. Our protocol is based on three cryptographic tools which are secret sharing, oblivious transfer and secure string equality test. Through the setting of secret sharing shares, the wildcard bits and non-wildcard bits are represented respectively. Combined with OT protocol, the wildcard pattern matching is converted into exact pattern matching, and finally the string equality test is called to determine whether the matching is successful. Due to the use of OT extension technology, all offline operations in our protocol are bit operations, which are very efficient and suitable for lightweight IoT devices.
